PART PLAYED BY THE SECOND BLACK WATCH DURING THE INVASION OF CRETE MAY 1941

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PART PLAYED BY THE SECOND BLACK WATCH DURING THE INVASION OF CRETE MAY 1941

MILITARY BACKGROUND

Prior to October 1940 Crete was regarded as a fuelling base for the Royal Navy for journeys between Alexandria and Malta. Suda Bay was considered to be the ideal site.

There were contingency plans for any invasion of Greece, by the Italians, to be met by a transfer of French troops, from Syria to Crete. When Italy did invade at the end of October 1940 there were no French troops in Syria as the latter had chosen to support Vichy France. In addition the indigenous Crete Division had left for the mainland of Greece in mid-November.

To fill the void the 14th Infantry Brigade (2nd Black Watch a part) was sent to Crete. It was a weak Brigade group (less two battalions), which began arriving on November 6th 1940. From this date until 27th April 1941 Brigade HQ formed the HQ of British troops in Crete. The Brigade Commander, Brigadier Tidbury, was the first British Commander in Crete.

The 2nd Black Watch arrived aboard HMS York and landed on 19th November.

The Brigade's task was to defend the RN fuelling base at Suda Bay and to prevent any hostile force from gaining a foothold. Tidbury did envisage an airborne attack on Heraklion, Retimo and Canea. He therefore initiated an intensive night and day digging programme to strengthen the defences of the island.

The 2nd BW was initially stationed at Suda Bay and took part in unloading stores and the defensive preparations. Unfortunately Tidbury's efforts were the exception and successive British Commanders did not follow his example.

Six months of comparative peace were accompanied by total inertia. This can be partly explained by the ambiguity as to the role of the garrison.

GEOGRAPHICAL BACKGROUND

The island is about 160 mile long, east to west, with a width varying from 7 to 35 miles north to south. A backbone of mountains rising to 7000 feet runs the whole length.

There were no railways and only one main road, which was very bad in places, skirted the north coast. Other "roads" linked this to the south coast across the mountains. One from Heraklion to Tymbaki; one very bad one from Retimo to Plaka Bay and one from Maleme to Selinos. From Suda a road climbed the mountains to the south but stopped a few miles short of Sphakia.

All bays and harbours were on the northern coast, which meant that they could only be reached by the Kaso straits at the eastern end of the island and the Antikithera and Kithera channels to the west; all of which were in easy reach of enemy aircraft.

The only country suitable for airfields was also on the northern side. These were located at Heraklion, Maleme and Retimo. Strictly speaking Maleme and Retimo were only landing grounds.

DEFENDING THE ISLAND

The length of the coastline and the number of potential landing beaches made the defence of Crete an extremely complex problem. The road was especially vulnerable as it was near to the sea and would be easily cut by sea borne troops.

This meant that the only feasible defence scheme had to be one based on separate self-contained sectors within which troops were mobile, well equipped and able to transmit and receive information rapidly. However both transport and equipment were to prove problems, which could not be overcome.

Defending an island as large as Crete with a small force under the permanent domination of enemy aircraft and out of range of its own was to prove an impossibility.

PREPARATIONS NOVEMBER 1940 TO APRIL 1941

Although Brigadier Tidbury envisaged an airborne attack on Heraklion, Retimo and Canea and carried out an intensive digging programme as a result this was not continued by his successors. This was a major dereliction of duty as the difficulties of the enemy would have been multiplied had full advantage been taken of the hiatus to turn Crete into a fortress.

Indeed the fact that there were five Commanders within 6 months was a major factor in adding to the confusion as to what the defence plan should be. In fact it would be closer to the truth to say that there was no defence plan. There was a marked tendency to regard Crete as a base for offensive operations without any regard for the need to operate from a secure base.

Once British troops were committed to Greece at the beginning of April 1941 the importance of Crete increased. It was decided to develop Suda Bay as a fleet base as opposed to a refuelling base. Nevertheless the defence of Crete was still very low on the list of priorities.

On April 18th 1941 the British Chiefs of Staff had the following priorities: -"Victory in Libya counts first; evacuation of troops from Greece second; Tobruk shipping, unless indispensable to victory must be fitted in as convenient; Iraq can be ignored and Crete worked up later."

The evacuation of Greece began on the 24th April with important consequences for Crete. The original plan of taking troops to Alexandria had to be abandoned and Crete substituted to quicken the turn around of ships.

Major General Weston (Royal Marines) Commander Mobile Naval Base Defence Organisation, who had been sent out to Crete to report on the situation, was ordered to prepare for 25000 evacuees and he arranged three reception areas----East of Suda Point, Canea area, 9 miles west of Canea.

General Wilson arrived at Suda Bay from Greece on April 27th. Wavell (C in C) asked him for his opinion on the garrison necessary for Crete. Wilson replied that given the weakness of the RAF he didn't think the island could be successfully defended.

No RAF operational units were located permanently in Crete until the operation in Crete began. The Fleet Air Arm maintained 805-fighter squadron at Maleme for the defence of fleet anchorage at Suda Bay and the RAF used Suda Bay as an advanced base for the flying boats of 230 squadron.

The principal task undertaken during the British occupation was the improvement of existing aerodrome facilities at Heraklion and the construction of additional aerodromes at Maleme and Retimo, Pediada, Kastelli, Messara Plain and Kassamos Kastelli.

Only Maleme, Retimo, and Heraklion were ready. The only aircraft pens constructed by April 27th were at Heraklion (9 pens) and on April 24th the number of serviceable aircraft were no more than 15 Blenheims and 12 fighters.

On April 30th Wavell flew to Crete and held a conference of senior officers. He made it clear that Crete was to be held in order to deny it to the enemy as an air base. Their objectives would be Heraklion and Maleme airfields. It was thus at this late date that the role of the garrison had finally been defined.

There would be no additional air support. On May 1st units in Crete were: 30 squadron at Maleme; 33 and 80 squadrons at Maleme; 112 squadron at Heraklion and 850 FAA at Maleme. Combined strength was 36 aircraft but only 18 were serviceable.

As far as the army was concerned the men on the spot at the beginning of May would have to suffice i.e. 14 IB and evacuees from Greece. Freyberg would command and Wilson was sent to Palestine.

FREYBERG'S PLAN FOR THE DEFENCE OF CRETE

Freyberg protested that the forces available to him were both insufficient and ill equipped to meet the expected scale of attack of 3000-4000 parachutists in the first flight. He was short of fighter aircraft and concluded that there would be little hope of repelling an invasion unless more were forthcoming.

Freyberg's plan, which was ready by May 3rd, was to dispose his troops into 4 self-contained sectors of Heraklion, Retimo, Suda Bay and Maleme. However his forces would be partially dispersed within these sectors with a view to protecting both the aerodromes and the beaches in their vicinity against airborne and sea borne attack.

DEFENCE OF THE HERAKLION SECTOR

The 2nd BW had handed over Maleme and moved to Heraklion during the second and third weeks of March. The move took a week to complete with part of the battalion coming by sea.

Creforce, with its HQ at Flagstaff Hill Canea and commanded by Freyberg, issued its Order of Battle and location statement on 3rd May.

The Heraklion Sector was occupied by the 14th IB group commanded by Brigadier Chappel and was constituted as follows:

Brigade Signal Section
7th Medium Regiment RA (improvised rifle battalion)
2nd Black Watch
2nd Yorks and Lancs
2/4th Australian Infantry Battalion
156 Lt AA Bty (less 2 troops)
1 troop and 1 section 7th Australian Lt AA Bty 6 Bofors
B Bty Notts Yeomanry 2 guns
2 Greek btns

Creforce Operational Instruction 10 accompanied the order of battle. This stated that enemy airborne attack on Crete could be expected at any moment. These would be focused on aerodromes and their vicinities and would probably be accompanied by sea borne attacks on beaches close to them.

The problem at Heraklion was to protect the town and harbour and the aerodrome (which lay about 3 miles to the east of the town) as well as the beach, on which sea borne or crash landings might be attempted.

Defensive measures were taken as follows:

10 Bofors guns (6 static and 4 mobile) located around the aerodrome.
2 sections (each of 2 field guns) were sited to the west and south west of the aerodrome to cover both it and the harbour.
2 Companies of the Black Watch with one platoon and a section of carriers dug in were located foe the defence of the aerodrome.
2 "I" Tanks were also concealed nearby.
The remainder of the Black Watch were dug in covering level ground adjacent to the aerodrome and one company was given a counter-attack role. Brigadier Chappel advocated a system of bays with alternate bays having overhead covers. They were not so easily located as slits.
9 100mm and 4 75mm guns together with 6 light tanks were located SW of the aerodrome.
The remainder of the Brigade occupied areas facing outwards about 2000 yards from the aerodrome.

The aerodrome was therefore defended by two perimeters - an inner and an outer. The inner was there to bring fire to bear on the aerodrome itself as well as being able to fire out to deal with any problem between them and the outer perimeter. The outer perimeter was to deal with any paratroopers in their areas and to prevent the enemy from bringing his mortars within range. There were also mobile troops to deal with landings beyond the perimeter.

These dispositions adopted by Brigadier Chappel were to prove very effective. Although he did suggest that Heraklion aerodrome would have been more easily defended had it been located 1000 yards to the South West.

The town of Heraklion was defended by one trained Greek Battalion and two Battalions of Greek recruits.

Brigadier Chappel imposed no restrictions on opening fire by AA guns but all else was to be concealed until the preliminary bombardment was over. Each unit was made responsible for immediate counter attack against paratroops in its own areas. Owing to the vulnerability of the parachutist upon landing there was to be such an attack within 15 minutes of landing. Counter attack later should only be undertaken with strong fire support.

The field guns were not to open fire on the aerodrome until ordered. The intention of Brigadier Chappel was to give this order only if troop carriers landed in numbers or the AA guns were knocked out.

Tanks and reserves as ordered by the Brigade HQ were to emerge and deal with parachute landings and troop carriers.

GENERAL EVENTS MAY 1st TO 20th 1941

In the days preceding the offensive the German air force was employed in an orthodox manner. High and low level bombing attacks were directed at defensive positions, AA guns, Harbour and shipping in Suda Bay, aerodromes and the aircraft on them.

The number of attacks on aerodromes increased after 13th May and was made easier by the lack of aircraft pens. In fact by April 17th there were only 9 and these were at Heraklion.

By the 19th May the Senior Air Force Officer, Group Captain Beamish, in consultation with the GOC had ordered the remaining seven serviceable fighters to Egypt.

The inability to provide fighter cover in Crete deprived the garrison of the most effective means of defence against airborne and sea borne attack.

The lack of adequate preparations made it impossible for Crete to house the 6 fighter squadrons deemed necessary for its defence. At this time there was not a full appreciation of the power of the air arm as a weapon of close support on the battlefield. This was undoubtedly a handicap and prevented the army from delivering its full force in the defence of Crete. German methods as yet had not been seriously studied and applied.

2nd BLACK WATCH POSITIONS

The 2nd Black Watch moved to Heraklion from Maleme during the second and third weeks of March. On the 30th April the C.O (Lt. Col A K Hamilton until 10/5/41 when due to ill health he was replaced by Major A A Pitcairn) attended area HQ and was told to expect a maximum air attack at any time from this date.

At 2145 orders were issued to all Companies for appropriate action including the striking and concealment of all tents, improvement of slit trenches and the continuous manning of battle positions. The battalion's positions on the 1st were:

Battalion HQ (69942)
HQ Company Contops Hill (6545)
A Company Alikarnossos Area (6050 to 5956)
B Company Aerodrome Ridge and west end of runway
C Company West Wadi (5546)
D Company "Charlies" Area square 73

By the 10th May however the aerodrome defences had been reorganised and the battalion was in the positions that it was to occupy during the forthcoming engagement. These were:

1. Battalion HQ on the southern edge of East Hill (8833)
2. HQ Company in the East Wadi area at the foot of the eastern edge of East Hill (9335)
3. A Company had one platoon next to HQ Coy's right hand position on 9034;one platoon on the southern edge of East Hill (8532); reserve platoon in the wadi west of the southern end of East Hill (8532)
4. B Company was the reserve company in the wadi west of East Hill 8534 to 8637
5. C Company occupied Aerodrome ridge area with one platoon at the western end of the runway (Gladys Post)
6. D Company had one platoon occupying a position along the north eastern side of the runway; one Platoon and Company HQ in the chalk pit area at the eastern end of the runway (8745); and one Platoon at the eastern end of the gorge.
7. Mortar platoon on East Hill- southern end (8733) and northern end (9037)
8. 4 Carriers were in a ditch in the wadi at 8932 - one under the command of D Coy and two under C.

The following officers commanded the Companies:

HQ Company Captain Gerald Barry
A Company Captain Alastair Hamilton
B Company Major Neville Blair
C Company Captain George Green
D Company Captain Archie Wilder

The airfield had a single concrete runway aligned NW/SE. The sea bound it 100 yards to the north and the road 100 yards to the south at a point called the "Gorge". It was dominated by a hill called "Apex Hill" which lay behind the "Charlies" and was to be denied to the enemy. Across the valley to the east was "Ames Ridge" named after the radar installation or Air Ministry Experimental Station at the summit.

Bombing and strafing of the airfield began on the 13th May when at 0620 and 2030 two waves of 5 planes each bombed and machine gunned posts around the airfield bringing the Bofors into action.

From then on air raids were continuous with some heavy bombing and strafing as for instance on the 16th when 30 ME 110's attacked the field.

Two "I" Tanks arrived at the RAF camp and were placed under the battalion's control on the 18th. The next day saw the first casualties (3 men wounded in C Company) when the ME 110's attacked again. All Companies were wiring on all fronts and priming anti-personnel mines.

At 1430 on the 20th the battalion was informed that enemy parachutists had landed at Maleme. An hour and a half later a large formation of enemy aircraft appeared overhead bombing and machine-gunning the aerodrome and gorge. This was followed 15 minutes later by a heavy dive-bombing attack.

The Junker 52's appeared at 1729 and disgorged the first parachute troops who dropped by the Greek Barracks and "Charlies". More were dropped at 1750 west of Heraklion; at 1800 SW of the "Charlies" (30); at 1819 9 planes again dropped large numbers near the Greek Barracks; at 1825 on the west side of Heraklion and at 1830 a large number landed in the East Wadi.

The 2 "I" Tanks were cruising in the vicinity of the Greek Barracks. One of them came to deal with some Germans in the barracks itself but the driver failed to negotiate the gate and knocked his gun sideways so that it never fired again.

The carriers were ordered out to destroy those Germans in the East Wadi. Two were unable to get out of their ditch and one carrier with 2/Lt Snowden ran into wire near A Coy's Cook House. 2/Lt Snowden was killed whilst trying to rescue his driver.

The Germans landing to the east and west of the airfield belonged to the 2nd Battalion of the 1st Parachute Rifle Regiment under Captain Burckhardt. The plan was for the east and west group of the battalion to take the airfield in a converging attack. The 3rd Battalion of the regiment under Major Schulz was to land SW of Heraklion and capture it.

The western group under Captain Dunz were mostly killed or wounded in the air. The remainder landed on the open space known as "Buttercup Field" where the tanks and infantry killed and wounded many before they could reach their weapons containers. There was no cover and the fighting only lasted twenty minutes.

The eastern group suffered a similar catastrophe. Their surviving officers Lts Hermann and Platow in a desperate charge up East Hill led those who reached the ground. They were caught in the crossfire of the 2nd Black Watch defences.

The enemy had suffered over 300 dead and 100 wounded. Only a few remained under Burckhardt at the foot of Ames Ridge.

Further landings were made at 1917 around Alikarnassos; at 1923 2-3 miles east of East Beach - in general further out from the airfield than previously. Mortar fire was brought to bear on a group of the enemy at 1930 that were collecting on the high ridge to the south of East Hill (9029). Heavy casualties were inflicted.

At 2100 Signallers were fired on when attempting to repair the line to HQ Company and 30 minutes later machine gunners were reported in the vicinity of Battalion HQ Officers Mess (8630). Then 15 minutes later a party carrying ammunition to HQ Company was fired on and withdrew leaving the ammunition behind. This had to be dealt with by a fighting patrol from B Company who recovered and delivered it. Thus at the end of the day the situation was deemed to be satisfactory. The Battalion's soldiers were tired but delighted and felt that their preparations had been vindicated.

THE BATTALION'S MOVES MAY 21ST

0630 Platoon from A Coy drives enemy from position near Battalion HQ Officers Mess

0730 HQ Coy ordered to recover the 2 Carriers bogged down in A Coy's Wadi.

0830 HQ Coy reported enemy forming up at "Rattling Bridge" and beginning to advance on their position down the road through the wadi.

0845 "I" Tanks ordered to destroy two light field guns seen 2 miles down the East coast road.

0920 Artillery fire brought to bear on enemy at Rattling Bridge (9638)

0938 Lt Fairlie's platoon from A Coy sent to deal with the enemy believed to be in British Uniforms in the village above Battalion HQ Officers Mess (9022).

1124 Lt Fairlie's patrol returned with 20 prisoners. A platoon of B Coy sent back to the village where a further 50 were seen collecting.

1130 "I" Tank moving down gorge. 60-100 of the enemy reported in Greek Barracks surrounded by Australians.

1153 Enemy attempting to move against Gladys Post.

1215 Orders to "I" Tank to move to East Wadi. The other to move against the Barracks.

1435 HQ Coy report enemy in front of them to be withdrawing.

1510 Orders to B Coy to destroy small party of enemy with light machine guns at northern end of East Hill.

1516 B Coy request mortar support for their attack.

1530 Area orders one Bren gun carrier and one tank to tackle enemy moving from barracks to the Slaughter House.

1540 B Coy capture post above gorge and take 20 prisoners.

1545 HQ Coy set fire to a house in front of their position with anti-tank rifle detonating the ammunition inside.

1709 Slaughter House found to be clear of the enemy.

1720 B Coy patrol return from village (9022) and report an encounter with the enemy. Casualties included 2/Lt Tweedy.

1723 AMES guard returned safely but without Corporal East who was KIA.

1737 C Coy mop up enemy paratroops around the slaughterhouse.

1750 11 planes drop paratroops in East Valley.

2005 Enemy reported advancing towards gorge.

BATTALION MOVES MAY 22ND

0530 Enemy believed to have evacuated barracks during the night. C Coy patrol sent out to ascertain their new positions.

0623 HQ Coy report no sight of the enemy during the night. The mortar post at the northern end of East Hill was re-established with a Bren gun carrier for local support.

0645 2 sections from A Coy sent out as patrols along the eastern edge of East Hill. HQ Coy reported a machine gun nest in East Wadi near to Rattling Bridge. "I" tank allocated to go out and mop it up.

0715 Intensive machine-gunning of HQ Coy's position.

0745 C Coy report Greek Barracks cleared.

0745 Orders from Area to clear the area between the airfield and the road to the slaughterhouse.

0825 Large number of bombers overhead. D Coy report machine gun posts between Rattling Bridge and the shore. One troop carrier lands 6 loads of "gear" in Ames valley by parachute.

0830 One troop carrier trying to land on the airfield but was driven off by Bofors fire.

0845 Enemy paratroopers dropped between the "Charlies" and aerodrome ridge. B Coy to attack at once. However they report that only supplies were dropped end destroyed it. One troop carrier was shot down by small arms fire.

0933 Area arrange for a company of the Leicesters to reinforce the battalion. Arrangements were made to send them to B Coy's Wadi.

0947 Informed that the Leicesters were leaving to reinforce us.

0955 13 troop carriers approach and move to the east followed by 10 more.

1215 Unable to send out troops to mop up East Wadi but order "I" Tanks to move out and destroy machine gun posts in that area.

1230 Slaughterhouse cleared by carriers and the enemy run to nearby caves.

1245 D Coy report that Tanks had to return due to mechanical trouble but were now moving off.

1300 One tank seen moving east down the coast road in East Wadi with Captain Wilder acting as a guide.

1410 Captain Wilder returned and reported that the enemy had a machine gun post on a rocky ridge on the far side of East Wadi (0640) and that he had also found an anti-tank gun in a ditch before Ames turning (0538).

1430 C Coy report the capture of 3 prisoners in caves in the vicinity of the slaughterhouse.

1535 6 troop carriers drop supplies on both sides of Ames ridge.

1547 Our artillery opened up on the dropped supplies.

1550 Orders from area to attack enemy rallying point on Ames ridge. Informed them that it wasn't possible and was the job of a reserve battalion.

1550 HQ Coy try to extricate bogged down carriers but still immobile by 1950.

1625 HQ Coy report being shelled by anti-tank gun and extensively machine-gunned.

1820 C Coy ordered to destroy machine gun nest in or around the RAF hangar.

2045 30 enemy troops come down from Apex Hill and surrender when their position was shelled.

BATTALION MOVES MAY 23RD

0530 Enemy plane dropped ammunition on the runway in response to the firing of a red verey light by us.

0800 Ration truck failed to reach 2/Lt McGibbon Lewis's party at the roadblock.

0830 Enemy parachute troops and containers observed dropping on Ames Ridge from sixteen planes. HQ Coy report twenty-nine or thirty troop carriers behind the Flat Top Mountains and Ames Valley, seventy five percent of the drop was estimated to be material.

0945 HQ Coy report one carrier recovered and now in service. The position regarding the enemy concentrations behind Ames Ridge discussed with Area. It was arranged that a further company of the Leicesters be sent so that large raiding force could be sent out.

0950 One further company of the Leicesters arrive in B Coy Wadi.

1025 Orders given to the two companies of Leicesters to carry out an extensive raid on the enemy forming up position behind Ames Ridge.

1035 Heavy machine gun and mortar fire in east Wadi, unable to locate gun position.

1235 Brigade report "the machine gun position pin pointed by the Australians at Reference 195342 orders given to barrage this position"

1343 RAF Hurricane lands on airfield.

1355 An enemy carrying party seen to leave a house on Ames Road. Guns ranged on this point.

1400 Hurricane pilot complains that the machine gun is trained on the runway and asks why the gun is not silenced.

1440 The Leicester seen moving through the saddle in Ames Ridge. Artillery registers a hit on enemy position on Ames Ridge.

1610 six ME110s strafe the aerodrome and destroy the Hurricane.

1930 Leicesters return having suffered 20 to 30 casualties. They encountered a small but heavily armed party of the enemy behind Ames Ridge. The conclusion was that there were not a great many of them but that there was a very high percentage of machine guns. Casualties were inflicted on the enemy.

2000 A Platoon of A Coy was sent to capture a number of enemy wounded reported to be sheltering in caves on the west side of the East Wadi.

2030 The Platoon return with thirty prisoners. The enemy is reported to be digging a mortar post on Ames Bridge near to the Saddle.

2130 A crashed troop carrier on Aerodrome Ridge was set on fire by C Coy.

BATTALION MOVES ON 24th MAY

0645 All Coys report a quiet night.

0700 C Coy catch a Greek demolishing a roadblock and send him to Brigade.

0745 Heavy bombing of Aerodrome.

0800 28 troop carriers drop supplies and troops west of the town.

0835 Heavy bombing of town and area behind the Charlies continuing.

1637 HQ Coy report that they are pinned down by a sniper and machine gun fire.

1657 A Coy patrols bring in twelve enemy machine guns and a quantity of ammunition.

1715 Heavy enemy machine gun and mortar fire on the eastern end of the runway.

BATTALION MOVES ON 25th MAY

0725 Enemy mortar fire on Btn HQ cookhouse.

0737 Lines to HQ dies.

0740 Communication re-established with HQ Coy.

0820 C Coy send out a mopping up patrol after three of the enemy who infiltrated past the slaughterhouse.

0915 Supplies and troops dropped on flat top mountain area east of the East Wadi.

1245 C Coy report the capture of three snipers in the slaughterhouse area.

1300 A Coy patrolling the gully between East Hill and the village due south find a transmitter, four rifles and five boxes of ammunition.

1540 HQ Coy report a sniper killed at 115 yards.

1605 C Coy have one man killed by mortars.

1727 Mortar fire drives two enemy out of a house by the Rattling Bridge.

1730 A Coy report two snipers in the Wadi beyond Btn HQ Cookhouse (8228). Patrols sent.

1815 Orders to A Coy to send a patrol up the gully to the village at 9022 and the high ground behind.

2055 Area reports no news of Sgt Corstorphine who left for Canea with two prisoners on 22nd May.

BATTALION MOVES ON 26TH MAY

0300 HQ Coy report the enemy advancing and firing on their position from 60 yards. One man wounded.

0745 Enemy observed on Apex Hill.

0755 Australians observed withdrawing down the forward slope of Apex Hill. Gunners ordered to open fire on Apex Hill.

0840 The Signal Corporal reports the enemy attacking the Australians through the Orange Grove between Apex Hill and Charlies. Also informed that the enemy circling east towards our positions one platoon of the Leicesters ordered to move up on to the ridge above their Wadi and to watch the enemy movement from the west.

0905 8 enemy troop carriers drop parachutists in the East Wadi to the right on HQ Coy's position.

0912 HQ Coy report a complete field gun dropped near the junction of the Coast Road and Ames Road.

1200 Enemy seen moving off Apex Hill.

1220 Enemy mortar fires on Btn HQ position. Area reports that the transfer of the enemy from the west of the town to the East Wadi area via Apex Hill seems likely.

1515 Orders from area for the withdrawal of one company of Leicesters. Orders to B Coy to send one platoon out to the village south of Btn HQ at 8228 to replace the one platoon of Leicesters already there.

1600 Enemy mortar fire on to B Coy Wadi below the telephone exchange. Orders given to B Coy to supply a guard platoon for the forward edge of East Hill, in place of A Coy.

2005 Area cancels move of Leicesters Coy.

2030 A single enemy plane dropped leaflets giving warning of reprisals against the ill treatment of German prisoners taken in Crete.

BATTALION MOVES 27TH MAY

0100 C Coy report enemy action around the Sangar position at the west end of the runway and send out a patrol.

0530 C Coy report that the patrol contacted the enemy that ran away.

0630 Artillery opens fire on the west slope of Apex Hill.

0840 A Coy report a new enemy gun firing on to the ground between B Coy and the Charlies. Believed to be in position behind Ames Ridge. A shortage of ammunition prevents the Artillery from strafing this position.

0845 C Coy report that their daylight patrol on the beach encountered no enemy.

0925 Stores and materials being dropped behind Apex Hill.

1200 Area asks for information from A Coy's patrol now out to the south of our positions. Captain Hamilton and Runners go out to contact the patrol to obtain the required information.

1300 Captain Hamilton returns with the information that the enemy are working in shirtsleeves on Apex Hill, and Area informed accordingly.

1350 From this time a great deal of enemy activity is noted on and around Apex Hill.

1510 Information from the Australians that they are sending a patrol at once to the north east corner of Apex Hill and the Argylls are sending one to the north west corner. A Coy is sent this information and a platoon is sent out on standing patrol.

1510 D Coy confirm that one of the carriers has been put out of action by bombing.

BATTALION MOVES 28TH MAY

0600 The CO attends a conference at Area and receives orders for evacuation.

0700 Heavy mortar fire on A Coy position and Btn HQ Wadi.

0745 A Coy HQ hit by a mortar bomb. Captain Hamilton and one other rank wounded.

0755 Arranged with artillery for Apex Hill to be counter-barraged. Captain Hamilton died of wounds.

1025 Orders to B Coy to send out a patrol south of East Hill to the small village above the gully at 9022.

1145 71 troop carriers over together. 64 dropped men and stores behind Table Mountain and 7 dropped stores behind Apex Hill.

1200 Coy Commanders Conference. Orders given to ABC and D Coys for evacuation.

2100 Orders to HQ Coy for evacuation.

2130 C and D Coys move off from the Aerodrome Area to Heraklion leaving the gorge platoon behind.

BATTALION MOVES 29TH MAY

0001 Btn HQ moves off along B Coy's Wadi to the RAF Camp.

0010 HQ Coy withdraw and move off to Heraklion down Dusty Road and B Coy's Wadi.

0020 A Coy withdraw from their position moving down B Coy's Wadi on the way to the Harbour.

0045 A Coy's rear platoon passes RAF Camp. Btn HQ fall in their rear and move off down the road to the Harbour.

0050 B Coy withdraw following in rear of Btn HQ.

0100 Gorge Platoon of D Coy withdraws, following B Coy to the Harbour.

0230 The Btn embarked on waiting cruisers and destroyers.

2030 Btn disembark at Alexandria and proceed to Sidi Bishr Transit Camp.

SUMMARY

The 14th Infantry Brigade at Heraklion had not been subjected to such heavy air attacks as the troops in the west. On the 20th May the initial landings were met with immediate counter attacks, which had been Brigadier Chappel's plan. All areas inside the British perimeter were clear of the enemy by 2130 and heavy casualties had been inflicted.

The Brigade was unable to prevent the enemy from growing stronger but they never lost possession of the airfield. Chappel's dispositions for the defence of the airfield proved remarkably effective and the days following the 20th were mainly concerned with mopping up.

After the first day inter-communication was only possible by the submarine cable between Suda and Heraklion. This became unserviceable on the 25th after which it was only possible to communicate by the cable between Egypt and Heraklion. The tactical situation was still satisfactory when Brigadier Chappel received orders through this link on 27th May to embark on the night 28th/29th.

The feeling inside the 14th IB HQ was that they had been let down by the performance at the other end of the island. Colonel Pitcairn of the Black Watch felt particularly bitter and would have echoed the views of Company Commander Alastair Hamilton (killed on the 28th) that "the Black Watch leaves Crete when the snow leaves Mount Ida".

The journey back from Crete was to prove eventful and readers should refer to a separate article on this in another part of the site.

APPENDIX ONE
	ROLL OF HONOUR OF 2ND BATTALION THE BLACK WATCH
	OFFICERS AND OTHER RANKS KILLED IN ACTION
	THE BATTLE FOR CRETE MAY 1941

	RANK	FIRST NAME	SURNAME	NUMBER	COMPANY	AGE	DATE	CEMETERY/MEMORIAL	COMMENT	OTHER INFORMATION

1	L/CPL	HARRY	MILLS	2758473	B COY	22	23/04/1941	SUDA BAY
2	L/CPL	WILLIAM	DUNN	2754675	C COY	26	30/04/1941	SUDA BAY
3	PTE	GILBERT	MARTIN	2752739		34	18/05/1941	SUDA BAY
4	PTE	MATTHEW	CAIRNS	2758427	D COY	23	20/05/1941	ATHENS MEMORIAL
5	CPL	FREDERICK	CHILES	2754005	H COY	25	20/05/1941	ATHENS MEMORIAL
6	CPL	JOHN	EAST	2754154	H COY	32	20/05/1941	ATHENS MEMORIAL
7	PTE	EDMUND	GOODALL	2754724	B COY	24	20/05/1941	ATHENS MEMORIAL
8	SGT	JAMES	HINDMARCH	2754771	D COY	25	20/05/1941	ATHENS MEMORIAL	20:00HRS
9	PTE	JAMES	HOWE	2759620	A COY	21	20/05/1941	ATHENS MEMORIAL
10	CPL	WILLIAM	HUNTER	2754078	B COY	29	20/05/1941	ATHENS MEMORIAL
11	PTE	JOHN	JONES	2758432	B COY	30	20/05/1941	ATHENS MEMORIAL
12	PTE	CHARLES	LANGLANDS	2754643	H COY	25	20/05/1941	ATHENS MEMORIAL
13	L/CPL	LOUIS	LEATHEN	2753626	H COY	26	20/05/1941	ATHENS MEMORIAL
14	PTE	HUGH	MACKIGGAN	2753610	D COY	27	20/05/1941	ATHENS MEMORIAL
15	CPL	JAMES	NICOL	2754518	H COY	24	20/05/1941	ATHENS MEMORIAL
16	2/LT	GEORGE	SNOWDEN	129095		27	20/05/1941	ATHENS MEMORIAL	18:32HRS
17	2/LT	JOHN	TWEEDY	156581	B COY		20/05/1941	SUDA BAY
18	WO 1	JOHN	ADAM	2749926	H COY	40	21/05/1941	ATHENS MEMORIAL	RQMS
19	PTE	HERBERT	COUSINS	2756414	B COY	20	21/05/1941	ATHENS MEMORIAL
20	PTE	ANDREW	DALGARNO	2754253	H COY	26	21/05/1941	ATHENS MEMORIAL	DOW
21	PTE	WILLIAM	DALLAS	2756166	A COY	19	21/05/1941	ATHENS MEMORIAL
22	PTE	THOMAS	MCWILLIAMS	2754694	C COY	25	21/05/1941	SUDA BAY
23	PTE	JOHN	MILLER	3054922	H COY	21	21/05/1941	ATHENS MEMORIAL
24	CPL	WILLIAM	MOIR	2754657	A COY	24	21/05/1941	ATHENS MEMORIAL
25	L/CPL	JOHN	MONTGOMERIE	2756199	B COY	21	21/05/1941	ATHENS MEMORIAL
26	PTE	ALFRED	MORRIS	2756423	C COY	21	21/05/1941	ATHENS MEMORIAL
27	PTE	JAMES	REEKIE	2756217	A COY	20	21/05/1941	ATHENS MEMORIAL
28	PTE	WILLIAM	SKINNER	2759816	C COY	24	21/05/1941	ATHENS MEMORIAL
29	SGT	JAMES	SUTCLIFFE	2754572	C COY		21/05/1941	ATHENS MEMORIAL
30	PTE	GEORGE	UNDERWOOD	2754617	B COY	29	21/05/1941	ATHENS MEMORIAL
31	L/CPL	JOSEPH	WATSON	2656684	B COY	25	21/05/1941	ATHENS MEMORIAL
32	L/CPL	JOHN	HAMILTON	2758306	B COY	26	24/05/1941	SUDA BAY
33	PTE	JOHN	BELL	2754959	H COY	22	26/05/1941	ATHENS MEMORIAL
34	DRUMMER	FREDERICK	WATSON	2754395	H COY	22	26/05/1941	SUDA BAY
35	PTE	JOSEPH	BATLEY	4537612		21	28/05/1941	ATHENS MEMORIAL
36	L/CPL	TERRENCE	BUCKLE	2759946	A COY	25	28or29/05/1941	ATHENS MEMORIAL	DOW
37	PTE	THOMAS	DICKSON	2754576		26	28or29/05/1941	ATHENS MEMORIAL
38	PTE	DOUGLAS	FARRAR	2754728		23	28or29/05/1941	ATHENS MEMORIAL	AT SEA
39	PTE	ALEXANDER	FINDLAY	2758610	H COY	22	28or29/05/1941	ATHENS MEMORIAL	AT SEA
40	PTE	DAVID	FINDLAY	2754701	C COY	27	28or29/05/1941	ATHENS MEMORIAL	AT SEA
41	L/CPL	MICHAEL	HALL-SMITH	2059461	H COY	18	28or29/05/1941	ATHENS MEMORIAL	AT SEA
42	CAPTAIN	JOHN	HAMILTON	62976	A COY	27	28/05/1941	SUDA BAY	MORTAR SHELL 0745	DIED OF WOUNDS 0755
43	L/CPL	JOHN	HERRON	2159918	H COY	25	28/05/1941	ATHENS MEMORIAL	AT SEA
44	PTE	JAMES	HOGG	2760199	C COY	21	28or29/05/1941	ATHENS MEMORIAL	AT SEA
45	DRUMMER	KENNETH	JONES	2754103		23	28/05/1941	ATHENS MEMORIAL	AT SEA
46	PTE	ALBERT	MASSON	2754759	H COY	27	28/05/1941	ALAMEIN MEMORIAL	AT SEA
47	PTE	DAVID	MCKENZIE	2759651	C COY	24	28or29/05/1941	ATHENS MEMORIAL	AT SEA
48	PTE	DAVID	MCPHERSON	2758007	C COY	28	28or29/05/1941	ATHENS MEMORIAL	AT SEA
49	PTE	DUNCAN	MCRAE	2756340	C COY	20	28or29/05/1941	ATHENS MEMORIAL	AT SEA
50	PTE	WILLIAM	NELSON	2755764	C COY	20	28or29/05/1941	ATHENS MEMORIAL	AT SEA
51	CPL	WILLIAM	NEWTON	2754007	C COY	27	28or29/05/1941	ATHENS MEMORIAL	AT SEA
52	PTE	CHARLES	ROBERTSON	2754867	H COY	26	28or29/05/1941	ATHENS MEMORIAL	AT SEA
53	PTE	ROBERT	ROBERTSON	2759656	H COY	24	28or29/05/1941	ATHENS MEMORIAL	AT SEA
54	PTE	GEORGE	SIMPSON	2754575		29	28or29/05/1941	ATHENS MEMORIAL	AT SEA
55	PTE	JAMES	TOCKER	2756265	C COY	20	28or29/05/1941	ATHENS MEMORIAL	AT SEA
56	PTE	DUNCAN	WHYTE	2754912	C COY	21	28or29/05/1941	ATHENS MEMORIAL	AT SEA
57	PTE	DAVID	WILSON	2756442	C COY	21	28or29/05/1941	ATHENS MEMORIAL	AT SEA
58	CPL	JOHN	WILSON	7342758	C COY	28	28or29/05/1941	ATHENS MEMORIAL	AT SEA
59	PTE	JOHN	LAW	2754427	H COY	28	29/05/1941	ATHENS MEMORIAL	AT SEA
60	CPL	DUNCAN	MACPHERSON	402195	D COY	29	29/05/1941	ATHENS MEMORIAL	AT SEA
61	PTE	CHARLES	SOUTAR	2030786	A COY	25	29/05/1941	ATHENS MEMORIAL	AT SEA
62	PTE	HERBERT	THOMPSON	2759939	D COY	25	29/05/1941	ATHENS MEMORIAL	AT SEA
63	PTE	FRANK	BROWN	2754875	H COY	22	30/05/1941	ALEXANDRIA(CHATBY)	DIED IN HOSP EGYPT	ACTION AT SEA
64	WO III	DUNCAN	CARMICHAEL	2753434	C COY	28	30/05/1941	ALEXANDRIA(CHATBY)	DIED IN HOSP EGYPT	ACTION AT SEA/MM/PSM
65	L/CPL	JOHN	COSTELLO	2754887	C COY		30/05/1941	ALEXANDRIA(CHATBY)	DIED IN HOSP EGYPT	ACTION AT SEA
66	L/CPL	WILLIAM	REID	2755000	C COY	22	30/05/1941	ATHENS MEMORIAL	AT SEA HMS ORION
67	PTE	DAVID	SMITH	2754710	H COY	27	30/05/1941	ALEXANDRIA(CHATBY)	DIED IN HOSP EGYPT	ACTION AT SEA
68	L/CPL	ROBERT	ANDERSON	2754372	H COY		31/05/1941	ALEXANDRIA(CHATBY)	DIED IN HOSP EGYPT	ACTION AT SEA
69	PTE	ALEXANDER	ROBERTSON	2759814			09/06/1941	PHALERON CEMETERY

APPENDIX 2
2ND BATTALION THE BLACK WATCH
THOSE WOUNDED CRETE MAY 1941

RANK	INITIAL	SURNAME	NUMBER	COMPANY	DATE	NATURE OF WOUND	COMMENT

PTE	W	HANLEY	2756150	C	19/05/1941
PTE	A	HOOPER	2759670	H	19/05/1941
L/C	T	LORIMER	2759899	H	19/05/1941
PTE	A	BRAND	2754685	B	20/05/1941
L/C	R	HEGGIE	2754566	B	20/05/1941
L/C	G	HENDERSON	2754172	A	20/05/1941
PTE	J	HUTTON	2758543	B	20/05/1941
PTE	A	KENNEDY	59805	D	20/05/1941
PTE	D	MCGLASHAN	2754650	C	20/05/1941	INJURY CALF
L/C	R	MULLEN	2756467	B	20/05/1941
PTE	A	ROBERTSON	2759814	A	20/05/1941
CPL	A	ROSS	2754847	D	20/05/1941
PTE	J	WALKER	2754484	H	20/05/1941
L/C	J	WARDLAW	2756420	B	20/05/1941
CPL		CATTERWELL			21/05/1941
2/LT	M	FAIRLIE			21/05/1941	GSW LEFT LEG
CPL	D	HUTTON	2754461	A	21/05/1941
PTE	J	LAING	2754954	D	21/05/1941
PTE	P	MIDDLEMAS	2756363	A	21/05/1941
L/C	D	NICHOLSON	2568138	A	21/05/1941
PTE	L	SCHOFIELD	2756368	B	21/05/1941	GSW LEFT LEG
PTE	H	HUTCHEON	2754862	D	22/05/1941
PTE	A	BIRSE	2754612	H	23/05/1941
DRUMMER	J	DUFFY	2754577	H	23/05/1941
PTE	J	GUTHRIE	2759695	B	23/05/1941
L/C	R	MANSON	2754902	C	23/05/1941
PTE	G	ANDERSON	2759882	B	24/05/1941
PTE	T	BOLL	2759687	H	24/05/1941
PTE	W	GOLLAN	2749238	B	24/05/1941
PTE	C	MELLORS	2756220	B	24/05/1941
PTE	J	METHVEN	3055336	H	24/05/1941
PTE	G	PURDY	2756353	B	24/05/1941
PTE	J	WEEKS	2759569	B	24/05/1941
PTE	D	BLAIR	2754901	H	26/05/1941
PTE	J	LISTER	2754921	B	26/05/1941
C/S	J	WALKER	5249022	D	26/05/1941
2/LT	G	DONALDSON			27/05/1941
PTE	E	BALLANTYNE	2759635	C	28/05/1941	BURNS ENEMY ACTION AT SEA
L/C	G	BARNES	2755057	C	28/05/1941	BURNS ENEMY ACTION AT SEA
PTE	D	CRATE	5725565	C	28/05/1941	BURNS ENEMY ACTION AT SEA
PTE	R	CRICHTON	2754482	H	28/05/1941	GSW CHEST AT SEA
BANDSMAN	G	GILL	3346520	H	28/05/1941	GSW LEFT HAND
PTE	R	INNES	2754067	D	28/05/1941	BURNS ENEMY ACTION AT SEA
PTE	R	MARSHALL	2754802	H	28/05/1941
PTE	A	MCCABE	2979882	C	28/05/1941	BURNS ENEMY ACTION AT SEA
PTE	A	MCMEECHAN	2759626	D	28/05/1941	ENEMY ACTION AT SEA
SGT	W	ROBERTSON	2754339	H	28/05/1941	BURNS ENEMY ACTION AT SEA
PIPE MAJOR	R	ROY	2216942	H	28/05/1941
PTE	D	SMITH	2754710	H	28/05/1941	BOMB BLAST ACTION AT SEA	DIED OF WOUNDS
PTE	R	STUPART	2754716	C	28/05/1941	BURNS ENEMY ACTION AT SEA
PTE	D	THOMSON	869833	C	28/05/1941	BOMB BLAST ACTION AT SEA
CPL	C	WALKER	2754799	H	28/05/1941	ENEMY ACTION AT SEA
L/C	J	ADAMS	2754371	D	??/05/1941
BANDSMAN	H	CARDELL	2754782	H	??/05/1941
L/C	J	COEY	2759950	H	??/05/1941	GSW HEAD
PTE	W	DONALD	2759952	C	??/05/1941	GSW SHOULDER
PTE	J	LINDSAY	2759958	B	??/05/1941
PTE	J	MCGUIRE	2754010	A	??/05/1941
PTE	G	MEATON	2758983	H	??/05/1941	GSW BACK
PTE	A	WALLACE	2758430	D	??/05/1941

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